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JUDICIAL JURISDICTION OVER FOREIGN
EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS
One of the more firmly entrenched common law rules of de-
cedents' estates provided that an executor or administrator could not
sue or be sued outside the state in which he received his letters of
appointment. The results reached by applying these rules bottomed on
the domiciliary contact were logical, predictable, and generally reason-
able. But the interstate flavor of many transactions arising from ex-
tensive changes in transportation, communication, and commercial
finance raise the question of the continued soundness of the solutions
which the application of these rules dictate. Whether more realistic
predicates than the categorical "no" of precedent can be formulated to
determine a foreign executor's amenability to suit is the question pursued
in this article.
THE COMMON LAW
The unquestionable common law rule in England and the United
States was that a foreign executor or administrator could not sue or
be sued without ancilliary letters of administration.1 The numerous
statements to this effect indicate an assumption that the rules were
generally thought to be corollaries.2 For all practical purposes, the rule
denying the foreign executor capacity to sue has been rendered in-
operative by legislative and judicial relaxation.' Removal of the foreign
executor's immunity from suit has met greater resistance. However,
the extensive overlapping of the legal foundations upon which the two
rules once rested makes singular treatment impossible.
Traditionally, the limitation was premised on the territorial con-
cept of the law.4 In essence, it was reasoned that maintenance of a
suit by a foreign jurisdiction would impinge on the sovereignty of the
domiciliary court. Another rationalization was the defect of power
1 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 513 (2d ed. 1841). "It
has hence become a general doctrine of the common law, recognized both in
England and America, that no suit can be brought or maintained by any executor
or administrator . . . in his official capacity, in the Courts of any other country,
except that from which he derives his authority to act in virtue of the probate
letters testamentary or the letters of administration there granted him. . . ." See
BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws, 1935, n. 1 (1916) [hereinafter
cited as BEALE]; McDOWELL, FOREIGN PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES, 31, n. 2 (1957)
[hereinafter cited as McDOWELL].
2 WOERNER, THE AMERICAN LAW OF ADMINISTRATION § 160 (3d ed. 1923);
BEALE supra note 1, § 507.
3 BEALE, supra note 1, § 512.1; GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 190 (3d ed.




position taken by the Restatement.' This view denies extra-territorial
recognition on the basis that the administrator is a statutory creature,
and as such has a power limitation imposed upon him the same as any
other self-operating statute. A third position was to dismiss the suit
because the appointing court to whom the fiduciary would have to
account would not be bound to give the judgment effect.' A further
justification sometimes presented was the desire of giving additional
insurance of equal administration for the protection of local creditors.
7
Carrying the first two propositions to their logical extremeties
would create an absolute jurisdictional defect, that, when combined
with the due process barrier, would prohibit any activity outside the
appointing state. Such was not the case. All courts recognized an
exception for extra-judicial conduct.' In addition, suits by a foreign
executor were permitted on negotiable instruments,9 judgments received
in the domiciliary state,' ° and in some jurisdictions, "as a matter of
comity in the interest of justice."'" If the foreign representative was
the plaintiff, the other party could waive the defect of capacity.
12
By creating exceptions in the hard cases the courts implicitly under-
mined some of the assumed foundations of the rules. First, on its face
it rebuts the argument that the rule is founded on a lack of power or
territorial limitation. Secondly, the concession that the jurisdictional
power exists in some instances discredits the position that the appointing
court need not give the judgment effect. If jurisdictional power exists,
the final determination of which rests in the enforcing court subject
to review by the United States Supreme Court, the full faith and credit
clause compels enforcement.'" While the want of power to enforce a
5 "The foreign representative has no power to act for the estate out of the
jurisdiction of the appointing court," RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAvS § 512
comment a (1934) ; annot. 40 A.L.R. 292 (1926).
6 Knoop v. Anderson, 71 F. Supp. 832 (N.D. Iowa 1947).
7 MCDOWELL, supra note 1 at 57; The real reason for prohibiting suits by
foreign personal representatives was the policy of protecting domestic creditors.
8Michigan Trust Co. v. Ferry, 228 U.S. 346 (1913).
9 "An administrator in possession of a negotiable instrument . . . can sue
upon the duty represented by such document wherever jurisdiction can be secured
over the debtor or his property," RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 509 (1934).
See Petersen v. Chemical Bank, 32 N.Y. 21 (1865), the leading case which
permitted suit by the assignee of a foreign personal representative.
10 Moore v. Kraft, 179 Fed. 685 (7th Cir. 1910) ; McCraw v. Simpson,
208 Ark. 471, 187 S.W.2d 536 (1945) ; Reed v. Hollister, 95 Ore. 656, 188 Pac. 170
(1920).
11 Vaughan v. Northrup, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 1 (1841); Cooper v. American
Airlines, 57 F. Supp. 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1949); Kirkbride v. Van Note, 275 N.Y. 244,
9 N.E.2d 852 (1937); An exception to the prevailing view that foreign adminis-
trators have no standing in our courts is sometimes made as a matter of comity
in the interests of justice.
12 McDOWELL, supra note I at 35.
13 U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 1. Full faith and credit can be denied when the
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judgment or decree may afford a reason against entertaining juris-
diction, it has nothing to do with the validity of the decree when made.
1 4
Concurrent judicial jurisdiction is a common occurrence in American
jurisprudence. And further, the fear of unequal administration of the
estate to the detriment of local creditors should be fully dissipated by
the interpretation the Supreme Court has given the privileges and im-
munities clause.' 5 Reduced to this level, the activities of foreign
fiduciaries become proper subject matter for legislative intervention.
STATUTORY MODIFICATION
From the point of view of efficient estate administration, the
inadequacy of the common law is displayed by the extensive legislative
modification. About half the states have adopted statutes permitting the
foreign executor to sue. 6 These statutes eliminating the necessity of
obtaining an expensive ancilliary administrator to collect the decedent's
assets have been uniformly upheld.' The results have been so satis-
factory that this procedure has been submitted and adopted by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.'"
Attempts to abolish the foreign executors' immunity from suit
have generally met with a different fate. In Pennsylvania the immunity
was rejected by judicial decision.' 9 As early as 1907 the Kansas Su-
preme Court upheld a statute that subjected the foreign executors to
suit."0 However, legislation in other states has uniformly met with
judicial resistance. 2 1  New York is representative. In Helnw v.
forum had no jurisdiction; if it exists the issues should be forclosed. Holt, Ex-
tension of Non-resident Motorist Statutes to Non-resident Personal Representatives,
101 U. PA. L. REV. 223 (1952). It is contended that this conclusion follows
because in Morris v. Jones, 329 U.S. 545 (1947), corporate assets of an Illinois
corporation in Illinois were subject to a Missouri judgment and full faith and
credit had to be given by the Illinois court.
14 In Michigan Trust Co. v. Ferry, supra note 8 at 356, the Supreme Court
speaking through Justice Holmes stated: A decree in equity against a defendant
who had left the state after service upon him and had taken all his property with
him would be entitled to full faith and credit where he was found. The judgment
of a "court" may be complete and perfect and have full effect independent of the
right to issue execution. (emphasis added.)
15 Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239 (1898).
16 See, BEALE, supra note 1, § 507.2; Note, 56 COLUM. L. REv. 915, n. 45
(1956).
17 Ibid.
18 Uniform Powers of Foreign Representatives Act (1944) §§ 1-5; See also
the handbooks of the National Conferences commencing 1940; "When there is no
administration or application therefore pending in this state, a foreign represen-
tative may exercise all powers which would exist in favor of a local represen-
tative, and maintain actions and proceedings in this state subject to the conditions
imposed on non-resident suitors generally." SIMES, MODEL PROBATE CODE (Michigan
Legal Studies 1946) Part V. p.234.
19 Giampalo v. Taylor, 335 Pa. 121, 6 A.2d 499 (1939).
20 Dewey v. Barnhouse, 75 Kan. 214, 88 Pac. 877 (1907).
2 1 KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 59-1708 (1949); MD. ANN. CODE, art. 16, § 158
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Buckelew2" Justice Cardozo dealt a crushing blow to a 1911 statute
which indiscriminately made foreign executors amenable to suit.2" In
MeMaster v. Gould24 a subsequent amendment providing for sub-
stitution of the executor when a defendant died during the pendency
of an action was held unconstitutional. The next year the statute was
repealed.
The Ohio statute may be in a position of equal jeopardy. Revised
Code Section 2113.71 provides that:
The several probate courts, courts of common pleas and
superior courts have the same authority over foreign executors
and administrators as if they were appointed in this state.
By way of dictum the Ohio Supreme Court in two early cases indicated
that the statute meant just what it appears to say.2" In Craig v. Toledo
.R.R.26 a lower court sustained the service on a foreign executor when
there were no assets in the state.
However, the 1957 decision of Brownewell v. Columbus Clay
Corp. casts serious doubt on the continued vitality of these precedents."
In that case an action was filed to declare an express trust (or at least
constructive) of shares of stock held by a California executor. A general
appearance was entered by the foreign executor. In dismissing the suit
Judge Bell stated a s
The defendant bank, being an executor appointed by the
Probate Court in California is an officer of the Court and
as such cannot be ordered by an Ohio Court to perform any
act dealing with the administration of its trust. Some mem-
bers of the Court entertain the doubt that such executor can
validly enter its appearance uithout first being authorized or
directed to do so by the court exercising jurisdiction over it.
(emphasis added.)
The Ohio statute was neither cited nor discussed by the court.2 9
(1951); N.J. STAT. ANN., § 3A:12-7 (1953) ; N.M. STAT. ANN., § 31-2-9 (1953);
N.D. REV. CODE § 28-0202 (1943); Wisc. STAT. § 287.16 (1951).
OHIO REV. CODE § 2113.70 (1953); OKLA. STAT. ANN., Tit. 58, § 262 (1951);
22229 N.Y. 363, 128 N.E. 216 (1920).
23 N.Y. Sass. LAWS 1911, c. 631, § 1.
24240 N.Y. 379, 148 N.E. 556 (1925).
25 Williams v. Welton, 28 Ohio St. 451 (1876); Swearington v. Morris,
14 Ohio St. 424 (1856).
26 Craig v. Toledo R.R., 2 Ohio N.P. 64, 3 Ohio Dec. N.P. 146 (1895);
see also Hamilton v. Taylor, 13 Ohio Dec. Rep. 975 (1873) where a foreign
executor who filed suit in the Ohio courts was held subject to a counterclaim.
27166 Ohio St. 324, 142 N.E.2d 511 (1957).
2 8 Id. at 323.
29 The court's finding that the situs of the stock under the Uniform Stock
Transfer Act was in California has been interpreted as precluding further inquiry
by the court. Survey of Ohio Law, 9 W. REs. L. REv. 268 (1957). But see Baker v.
Baker, Eccles & Co., 242 U.S. 394 (1916), where the Supreme Court held that due
process precludes determination of the course of devolution of personal property
1959]
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The above excerpt exemplifies the general reaction of the courts.
It also points up the reason for the different attitude accorded legislative
abrogation of the foreign executor's immunity as opposed to the
removal of the limitation on his capacity to sue. The confusion the
courts create when confronted with statutes removing the immunity
stems from regarding the executor as having a dual personality.30 He
is both a private individual and legal representative for the estate.
Therefore, if the basis of jurisdiction is the executor's appearance and
the action is in the nature of in personam, the suit cannot be maintained
because the executor is not personally liable. On the other hand, if it is
contended that the suit is in rem or quasi-in-rem, the suit is dismissed
because the estate, even if it is considered a res, exists only in the
domiciliary state. Thus, unless the decedent has left property in the
state over which the plaintiff can obtain in rem jurisdiction the suit is
dismissed because of the jurisdictional defect.
Relief from the dilemma in which this conceptualism casts a plain-
tiff is offered from two sources. First is the view taken by Professor
Scott that the suit need not be either in rem or in personam. 31
The judgment . . . is not exactly a judgment in rem or a
judgment in personam; but it is a judgment which makes
res judicata the existence and extent of the plaintiff's right to
damages.
Another analysis is that taken by the United States Supreme Court
in the 1848 case of Stacy v. Thrasher.2 The court in rejecting the
argument that a privity exists between an executor and administrator
appointed in different states said the position: 3
[A]ssumes that the judgment is in rem and not in personam,
or that the estate has a sort of corporate unity or entity. But
this is not true in either fact or legal construction. The
judgment is against the person of the administrator that he
shall pay the debt of the intestate out of funds committed to
his care.
The reasoning of these two views was implicitly adopted in two recent
New Jersey decisions brought against foreign executors.34 But before
turning to these cases a review of a body of law evolving from the
non-resident motorist statutes is imperative.
situated in another state as against residents of the latter, who do not appear in
the proceeding. The general appearance by the foreign executor in the Brownewell
case would have met this type of due process argument.
80 Knoop v. Anderson, 71 F.Supp. 832 (N.D. Iowa 1947); Leighton v. Roper,
300 N.Y. 434, 91 N.E.2d 876 (1950).
31 Scott, Hess and Pawloski Carry on, 64 HARv. L. Rav. 98, 104 (1950).
8247 U.S. (6 How.) 44 (1848).
33 Id. at 60.
34 Farone v. Habel, 22 N.J. 66, 123 A.2d 506 (1956); Jacobs v. Rothstein,
23 N.J. 641, 130 A.2d 384- (1957).
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THE NON-RESIDENT MOTORIST STATUTES
The story of Hess v. Pawloski3 and its successors is too well known
to necessitate citation. All states and the District of Columbia have
since enacted legislation subjecting the non-resident who uses the high-
ways to the court's jurisdiction. As originally enacted no provision was
made for service on the non-resident executor or administrator in event
of the non-resident's death before or during a suit. It was uniformly
held that jurisdiction could not be obtained in these situations because
the statutory agency, not being coupled with an interest, was terminated
on the principal's death.3 6 Further justification was based on the neces-
sity of strict construction of statutes in derogation of the common law.
37
Thus, in accidents serious enough to result in the death of the
non-resident defendant-where there would be greater probability of
injury to other persons-the immunity of the foreign executor com-
pletely frustrated the objective of the statute. To remedy this weakness
nine states including Ohio have implemented the non-resident statutes
by providing for an irrevocable agency. 38 The statutes bind the per-
sonal representative to service of process in the same manner the motorist
would have been served had he survived, or in event of his death after
service, provide for substitution of the representative as the defendant.
A federal district court in Iowa was the first to adjudicate the
constitutionality of this type statute.39 In striking the statute down as
unconstitutional the court in Knoop v. .Anderson based its decision
primarily on the in rem and in personam argument presented earlier.
The courts in all subsequent decisions have sustained the statutes.40 In
Leighton v. Roper,4 the leading New York decision, the statute was
upheld as a reasonable extension of the state's police power.
By relying on the police power the courts are implicitly extending
35 Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927); The United States Supreme Court,
recognizing the states' interest in the enforcement of regulations reasonably calcu-
lated to promote care on the part of those who use its highways upheld the con-
stitutionalty of a statute subjecting non-resident motorists to service of process in
the state.
36Buttson v. Arnold, 4 F.R.D. 492 (D.C. Pa. 1945); Brogan v. Macklin,
126 Conn. 92, 9 A.2d 499 (1939); Young v. Potter Title & Trust Co., 114 N.J.L.
561, 178 Ati. 177 (1935) ; Dowling v. Winter, 208 N.C. 521, 181 S.E. 751 (1935)
Harris v. Owens, 142 Ohio St. 379, 52 N.E.2d 522 (1943).
37Rogers v. Edwards, 164 Kan. 492, 190 P.2d 857 (1948); Riggs v.
Schneider's Ex'r, 279 Ky. 361, 130 S.W.2d 816 (1939) ; Downing v. Schwenck,
138 Neb. 395, 293 N.W. 278 (1940); State ex rel. Ledin v. Davison, 216 Wis. 216,
256 N.W. 718 (1934).
38 O nio REV. ConE § 2703.20; Note, 28 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 347 (1950).
39Supra note 6; Stimson, Conflict of Laws: JJ'hen Does a Court Have
Jurisdiction, 45 A.B.A.J. 569, 572 (1959).
40 Feinsinger v. Bard, 195 F.2d 45 (7th Cir. 1952) ; Plopa v. Supre, 327 Mich.
660, 42 N.W.2d 777 (1950); Leighton v. Roper, 300 N.Y. 434, 91 N.E.2d 876
(1950) ; Tarczynski v. Chicago R.R., 261 Wis. 144, 52 N.A,.2d 396 (1952).
41 300 N.Y. 434, 91 N.E.2d 876 (1950).
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judicial jurisdiction by looking to the connection the defendant and the
cause of action have with the forum. The defendant's death as well
as the fact that the administrator or executor is the formal party de-
fendant are treated as fortuitous facts. The only contacts of the
defendant with the forum that are considered relevant are those that
have a proximate relation to the cause of action.
SYNTHESIS
Have the non-resident statutes become the wedge which determines
the future contraction of the foreign executors' immunity to suit?
Should not the contacts of the decedent with the forum state where the
cause of action arose always be relevant in determining whether or not
a court should exercise jurisdiction? Would making judicial jurisdiction
co-extensive with legislative jurisdiction be too great a burden on the
administration of decedents' estates?4 Should not the fact that the
decedent was domiciled in a different jurisdiction be a fortuitous fact?
If legislative jurisdiction exists, should not the foreign executor's appear-
ance in the forum state silence the due process argument?
These problems were met by the New Jersey Supreme Court in
the recent decision of Farone v. Habel.43  In an unamious opinion the
court held the lower court should have entertained the suit. The
original transaction giving rise to the plaintiff's cause of action arose in
New Jersey. The executor was served while he was in New Jersey
aiding in the supervision of a diner for the benefit of the estate. In its
opinion the court stated: 4
The reasons advanced in support of the broad immunity
generally afforded to foreign representatives have properly
been questioned (citations omitted); the immunity has often-
times unjustly compelled residents to seek relief in distant
places even when the foreign representatives could be served
personally within the State's borders and their fiduciary activi-
ties within the State exceeded by far the minimum juris-
dictional contacts which may be said to be necessary to satisfy
due process requirements and firmly imbedded concepts of
fair play and substantial justice (citations omitted). In any
event, New Jersey's statutes now clearly embody wide legis-
lative authorization for the naming of foreign fiduciaries as
defendants in New Jersey actions; our judicial function is to
effectuate this statutory authorization zuithin the controlling
constitutional limitations, both state and federal. (emphasis
added.)
42 The phrase "legislative jurisdiction" in this article is intended to designate
the state whose substantive law would be referred to in a conflict of laws situation.
43 Supra note 34.
44 22 N.J. 66, 69, 123 A.2d 506, 509 (1957).
[Vol. 20
1959]
In Jacobs v. Rothstein' the constitutionality of the same statutes
were again drawn into question in a false representation suit arising out
of the sale of land. The plaintiffs were New Jersey residents, buying
New Jersey land from the decedent who at the time of the sale was a
New Jersey resident. The decedent became domiciled in New York
before his death and the letters of appointment were to a New York
attorney who resided in New Jersey. In following the Farone
decision and sustaining the lower court's assertion of jurisdiction the
court set out a two step analysis by which courts should determine
whether foreign executors and administrators should be amenable to
suit in the forum.4" First, are the connections between the parties and
the controversy so close to the forum that, upon considerations of comity
and convenience, jurisdiction should be taken? And two, has the for-
eign executor had such dose contact with the forum that the minimum
jurisdictional contacts necessary to satisfy due process have been met?
CONCLUSION
The common law rule of absolute immunity of foreign executors
and administrators has little more than its age to support it. In de-
termining the power of a state to invoke its jurisdiction, recognition
should be given to the substantial interests connecting the decedent
with that state. The isolated factor of his place of domicil at the time
of his death only takes into consideration the speed with which an estate
can be dosed. "The main object to be attained [in estate adminis-
tration] is the prompt, fair and convenient handling of an estate for
the benefit of all of those concerned therein." 4  Highly realistic con-
siderations such as the protection of citizens in other states is a small
price to pay for the additional impediments to the closing of an estate.
Charles E. Taylor
45 23 N.J. 641, 130 A.2d 384 (1957).
4 6 Id. at 385.
4 7 RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS, ch. 1, topic 1, introductory note (1934).
